Despite being governed as an integral part of the Indian Empire for over fifty years, it is commonplace for historians to consider Myanmar/Burma as a distinct entity beyond what is usually taken to be South Asia. This is a heuristic separation indulged by both scholars of colonial India and colonial Burma and is in part a legacy of the territorial assumptions of Area Studies. Recently new geographic frameworksÑparticularly the Indian Ocean, Eurasia and ZomiaÑhave begun to undermine the basis of this artificial division. Building on these insights, this essay argues that the apparent distinctiveness of the Burmese experience of the Raj might be a useful problem for historians of colonial India to think with.
In 1900, W. Northley, a colonial buying agent, wrote to the India Office asking whether Rangoon was in India or not. He explained that one of his clients insisted that the city was in ÔBurmahÕ and not India. For his part, he contended that ÔBurmahÕ was itself a province of India and thus, by extension, Rangoon was in India. The response from the India Office was simple and straightforward. Rangoon was a town in British Burma, which was a province of British India. They confirmed NorthleyÕs belief that Rangoon was indeed in India. 1 This innocuous correspondence on the administrative arrangements through which Rangoon was incorporated into the Indian Empire hints at some of the deeper uncertainties about the colonial historical geography of the region. The status of Rangoon (a corruption of the Burmese name 2 Yangon) in Myanmar/Burma was transformed by colonial rule. 2 After being occupied by the Indian Army in the Second Anglo-Burmese War of 1852, it was rebuilt and became a thriving commercial hub. British rule also made it into the administrative centre for the colony, which it remained after 1885 when the Konbaung dynasty was unseated in Mandalay as rulers of the landlocked remnants of the independent Burmese empire. When this last region too was annexed, political power shifted from the northern dry zone to the coastal south. In addition, the cityÕs demography changed. As a major port situated in the middle of a rapidly expanding rice producing region, it attracted large numbers of Indian labourers seeking work in the mills and other urban industries. By the twentieth century, Indians began to outnumber Burmese in the city. It was now a plural, or, perhaps more accurately, a cosmopolitan, urban society.
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For some historiansÑparticularly those with an implicit nationalist bentÑwhether colonial
Rangoon was truly a Burmese city remains an open question. Historian of the Pagan Dynasty, established in the tenth century, Michael Aung-Thwin has argued that the traditional cultural and political heartland of Myanmar has long been, and remains, the Ôup-streamÕ, dry region in the centre of the country. It was from here that the majority of pre-colonial kingdoms have ruled and here that they had built their courtly capitals. In his analysis, British imperialism had only a superficial impact on this state of affairs. The deeper psychology of the Burmese, he suggests, was largely unaffected by colonial rule and the dry zone was never displaced as the spiritual centre. RangoonÕs place as a political centre was a temporary shift in the historically more significant dominance of the dry zone, around the confluence of the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy, the countryÕs major rivers.
Moreover, for him, it was a foreign imposition and a site in which exogamous influences exerted themselves, although failing to meaningfully penetrate the rest of country. 4 If Aung-Thwin were asked if colonial Rangoon was in India, his response might be that in a strict bureaucratic sense it was in British Burma and, thus, in India. But, he would perhaps note, it was not of Myanmar and resembled more an imperial city of the Indian Empire.
3 Aung-ThwinÕs approach was influenced by Ôautonomous historyÕ, a method applied by some Southeast Asian historians, and one that encourages researchers to focus on underlying continuities in societies and cultures over long time periods. This method was itself deemed necessary, in part, as a response to the perceived lack of internal dynamism in Southeast Asian historical processes in much colonial-era scholarship. This work generally ascribed causation in pre-colonial changes in the region to the influence of its sub-continental neighbours, China and India, and subsequent changes to EuropeÕs influence. 5 However, one of the problems perennially faced by historians attempting to write autonomous histories of the region has been finding processes that were uniquely endogamous to the region, or any that were shared across its diverse states and cultures. 6 Reflecting on this, it has been shown that the separation of Southeast Asia from East Asia and South Asia in the Euro-American academic discipline of Area Studies was the result of universitiesÕ institutional responses to the geo-political imperatives of the Cold War. 7 Today the Indian Ocean, conceived of as a space of historical interconnection, communication and exchange, appears to have better purchase as a geographic framework for historians, especially at a time when networks and webs are the social arrangements that scholars are most concerned with uncoveringÑ although the inherent coherence and unity of the Indian Ocean has also been questioned. 8 Eurasia too has been suggested as a useful geography for mapping connections and identifying parallels that transcend the traditional Area Studies territorial categories, bringing East, South, Southeast and Central Asia together with the Near and Middle East and Europe. 9 I do not wish to dwell on these, perhaps intractable, problems of historicising the regions of the world here. It suffices to note that the persistent limitations of Southeast Asia as a geography, and the apparent utility of more expansive spatial frameworks, make locating Burma more difficult than Aung-ThwinÕs approach would suggest. Exogamous and endogamous processes are not so easily distinguished given the existence of wider, intra-and trans-continental connections and broadly synchronous patterns of historical change. If, as result of these trends, the geographies deployed by historians are becoming more tentative and fluid, we might also need to ask, not quite if Burma is in India, but whether it 4 might usefully be thought of as part of South Asia. This is a question that is most pertinent for studies of the colonial period.
Aung-ThwinÕs argument that colonial rule had little lasting impact in Burma notwithstanding, historians have most often viewed its incorporation into the Indian Empire as a profound moment of rupture, the effects of which continue to be felt. John Furnivall, the colonial official, Fabian socialist and Burma scholar who mostly wrote in the early-twentieth century before independence, perhaps did the most to set this narrative in motion. In his analysis of early British rule in Tenasserim after the first Anglo-Burmese War of 1824, he argues that attempts to govern Burma according to indigenous patterns and expectations were swept aside by the bureaucratic juggernaut that was the Government of India. 10 Whilst FurnivallÕs own subjective perspective has been critiqued and the substance of his arguments substantially challenged, 11 his overarching story still holds in many histories. Historians have focussed particularly upon the development and imposition of the Village Act following the annexation of Upper Burma in 1885. This legislation, taken from British Indian legislation, was enacted in the newly occupied colony by imperial fiat displacing the forms of local government that had been reformed by the Konbaung court during the nineteenth century. 12 It has been argued that in this sense Burma experienced a form of double colonisation, at the hands of both the British and also India, whose laws were imposed and whose populace staffed many branches of the colonial state. It has also been suggested that the colony was a Ôneglected appendageÕ onto the Indian Empire and that in an attempt to keep costs down the British maintained a minimal Ôskinny stateÕ. As a result, they relied excessively heavily upon the military to keep order. 13 Whatever the utility and accuracy of these characterisations, they rely upon a homogenising representation of the state in colonial India, one that fails to recognise the diversity of administrative structures present across the Raj and as a result misses parallels that might otherwise be drawn with places, for instance, such as the North West Frontier Province.
Whilst India might have an overly simplified but important role attributed to it in Burmese historiography, this is certainly not the case when positions are reversed. Burma is usually left out 5 of studies of colonial India that otherwise pertain to offer an overview of the whole imperial territory. This is clear in text books. Sugata Bose and Ayesha JalalÕs popular book Modern South Asia, still a staple of many undergraduate reading lists, makes only fleeting references to Burma.
These are mostly confined to the subcontinentÕs cultural influence in Southeast Asia, the military engagements of the Indian Army under British rule, and the fate of the Indian National Army as it was led into defeat by Subhas Chandra Bose. It would not be apparent to a reader that the country was ruled as part of British India for over fifty years. 14 An earlier offering, Sumit SarkarÕs Modern India, likewise barely touches on Burma. This book begins in 1885, when Burma was annexed into British India, and when the Raj reached its fullest extent, but the selection of this date was based on the foundation of the Indian National Congress. SarkarÕs book is instructive because of the effort made to incorporate a diverse range of different political and social movements from localities across the colony. Yet, events in Burma find no place in his study. 15 This omission means that the largest peasant rebellion faced by the Indian Government in his time period, the Hsaya San rebellion in the Burma delta in 1930, is overlooked. 16 The failure to cover Burma in these overview texts, written for audiences new to South Asian history, is a symptom of the implicit national framework used by historians to limit their studies geographically. However, it is an implicit framework that is anachronistic and ahistorical, and it is one that the critical deconstruction of national frameworks has done precious little to displace. 17 One area of research in which this separation of Burma and India has been questioned has been in studies of upland borderworlds. The work of Willem Van Schendel has done a great deal to enable scholars to re-imagine the borderworlds between the two and question the logic of a strict separation between South and Southeast Asia. The historical existence and persistence of networks of interaction across the upland regions of north-eastern India, Bangladesh, Myanmar/Burma and southern China led him to coin the term Zomia to capture the geography of this complex spatial system, which is irreducible to beginning defined as a bounded place or area. 18 It is a term that has been picked up recently by James C. Scott, whose claim that the societies of Zomia were ÔanarchistÕ 6 has sparked wider debates about the narratives and spacing of global history. 19 On a smaller scale though, this re-imagining of space has led to work less restricted by formal territorial boundaries.
Recent research into the emergence of Kachin identity has shown that historiansÕ narratives can, and should, move across state borders. 20 definitions of what constituted religion. 25 These authors are also a sign that the methods and concerns of historians of colonial Burma are closer to those of historians of colonial India than ever before.
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The specific experiences of colonial rule in Burma might alter our wider understandings of 2 I am using Myanmar/Burma when referring to a time period across which both names have been used. Burma, when I am referring to a time period when only this name was officially usedÑ
Myanmar also being a longstanding name for the country. And, when relating to the work of authors who exclusively use Myanmar, I follow their usage.
